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ABSTRACT

This research is based on a case study of a Japanese
company in the United States.
The study traces the change
in the perceptions of the Japanese management through
ethnographic information collected from interviews with the
Japanese and Americans as well as from extensive
observations of the company.
When the company began its operation three years ago,
the Japanese management emphasized the importance of
establishing a community model: the managers attempted to
create a ’f a m i l y ” atmosphere within the office.
However, the combination of various factors including
growth in business, cultural difference, and the Japanese
monopoly of power led to the erosion of the community mode1
in the office.
All these factors created a duality within
the office incompatible with the community model.
As a result, after three years since the establishment
of the company, the priority of the Japanese managers has
shifted from a "family" model to an effort to control their
American staff members through a "manual," which
mechanTcally defines the content and methodology of p arh
individual's job.

JAPANESE BUSINESS IN. THE UNITED STATES
UNINTENTIONAL DEFINITION OF THE OTHER

Chapter I
Introducti on

The number of Japanese companies in the United States
has grown rapidly in the past decade as direct investment
from Japan has increased from $1.6 billion in 1980 to $22.3
billion in 1988.

The increase in the manufacturing sector

has been even more dramatic as investment has grown 23 times
in eight years, or $0.4 billion to $9.1 billion (OECD 1989:
97).

By deciding to establish transplants in the United

States in order to cope w ith the increasing value of the yen 5

^

and U.S.-Japan trade friction, large Japanese manufacturers
lead this trend.

In turn, the large Japanese manufacturers

encourage smaller Japanese suppliers to establish their
plants and offices in the United States.

This influx of

Japanese companies is likely to continue: one estimate
reports that by the turn of the century, 850,000 to one
million Americans will be employed by Japanese companies
(Rehder 1990: 87).
The increase in Japanese companies in the United States^)
—

—---- ■
—

has started to draw attention from scholars.

——

Johnson and

Ouchi, for example, conducted a case study in 1974 of Sony

2

viasU k

.

3

Corporation in California and praised its management style
for accomplishing successful plant productivity.

However,

recent assessments of Japanese firms in the United States
have been more cautious. Kidahashi saw the presence of clear
duality between the Japanese and Americans in a Japanese
secuxities firm (1987).

Other case studies also report the
irvt»o/'-'-7"c5

conflict of two cultures and nationalities within one
1
organization.
In his comprehensive assessment of Japanese

i

transplants in the United States, Rehder says that the
"honeymoon" is over and indicates a number of potential
problems (1990)

.

Popular magazines and newspaper articles^.

have also begun pointing to the culture clash seen in
"2

U.S.-based Japanese firms.____
The case study conducted in this paper is considerably ^ ^
smaller in scale than the other studies that have focused on
large Japanese corporations.

The subject of this study,

Metric Tools International, Inc. (MTI), is a small, young
company established in the United States in order to cater
3
to a larger Japanese firm. Three-year-old MTI, a joint
venture of large and small Japanese firms, is comprised of\
four Japanese managers and six American staff members.
Unlike large corporations such as Sony, M T I 's financial and
human resources are limited.

The management, with no

assurance of success, is groping its way through many
uncertainties in this foreign land.

<
>

4

My intention is not to draw any universal conclusiory^W^\c
about Japanese firms in the United States from this case
study of one small Japanese company.

Rather, this study

provides a view of the human interaction in a U.S.-based
Japanese office between the Japanese and Americans, neither
of whom has a profound understanding of their counterpart's
culture.

I have focused my attention on the perspectives o>f>j^„,

the Japanese because, as a Japanese student in American
Studies who once worked with the other Japanese at MTI, I
was more interested in their ideas and visions of America .
From the ethnographic information I collected, I intend to
demonstrate how the Japanese perceptions of America and
Americans have shifted since the company's establishment.
To show this shift in perceptions, I will begin in the
second chapter

with a portrait of MTI as well as an

explanation of

the methodological background of this case ^

study.

Next, I have set up three ethnographically-based

chapters in which I show the transition of the Japanese
perspectives about America and its people since the
establishment of the company three years ago.

The third

chapter describes the first phase of MTI from January 1989
to December of

the same year when the Japanese gave priority

to establishing a community model

within the office.

The

fourth chapter describes the following year, January 1990 to
December 1990, when events that undermined the concept of

5

the community model took place.

The fifth chapter traces

the company from January 1991 to the present during which
time when the Japanese lost interest in the community model
and a duality between the Japanese and Americans emerged.
The final chapter contains a more open-ended analysis rather
than a conclusive statement because the company's future
operations are likely to continue to alter the Japanese view
of America.

I hope this case study will contribute to a

better working relationship between the Japanese
businesspeople in the Untied States and Americans employed
by Japanese companies.

I
V\v*~ vv-yV?
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Chapter II
Portrait: Metric Tools International

II.I. The City:

1

Metric Tools International, Inc.

(MTI) is located in a

rural midwestern city of approximately 30,000 people.

The

city has eight industrial parks, although dairy farms and
corn fields surround its border.

In fact, the city enjoys

16 industries that hire more than 150 employees each,
distinguishing itself as one of the major industrial areas
in the state.

Two of the largest industries hire a total of

more than 9,000 employees, attracting many workers from
outside the city.

As a result, an estimated 51% of the

local population are blue collar workers.
In the 1980s, the city's two largest industries
suffered a considerable decline in their business, resulting
in a large number of layoffs.

However, due to the efforts

of city officials, the area has succeeded in luring 17
foreign corporations to establish their plants and offices
in order to provide alternative jobs for displaced workers.
Nine of the 17 corporations are Japanese (three distributors
and six manufacturers), hiring a total of more than 1,100

6

7

employees.

As the number of Japanese companies increases in

the city, the Japanese population grows in proportion.

The

more than 300 Japanese people in the city qualifies them as
one of the largest minority groups in an area where 98% of
the population is white.

The relationship between the

Japanese and Americans has been generally amicable,
according to the Japanese executives, their wives, and local
city officials.

However, some cases of racial harassment in

the form of threatening phone calls have been reported.
Several factors influenced MTI to locate itself in this
city.

First, a Japanese transplant that would become MTI's

largest customer was located in the area (the transplant's
parent company in Japan has a very close tie with MTI's
parent company).

Second, a number of Japanese manufacturers

that might require the service MTI could offer had their
transplants in the region.

Already, approximately 100

Japanese companies existed within the state.

Lastly, as

noted above, the local city officials campaigned to attract
Japanese companies in order to better the area's sagging
economy.

II. II. The Company:
MTI was incorporated as a joint-venture business in
January of 1989 with three parent companies sharing its
stock.

Kogu Corporation, one of the largest tool

8

distributors in Japan, holds a 60% share of the stock.

For

Kogu, which enjoys an annual sales exceeding $170 million in \
^
^
Japan, MTI was its first international office to be
'
J
2
fti9^ l"H.
established.
Another 30% share comes from Boeki
p O 'jr

Corporation, a Japanese trading firm (sogo shosha), and the
rema-ining 10% is owned by its American subsidiary, Boeki
America, Inc.

In contrast with Kogu, Boeki has over 150

overseas offices, and its annual revenue exceeds $105
billion.

Boeki America, headquartered in New York City,

boasts sales of over $17 billion a year, making the company
3
one of the largest exporters m the United States.
The parent companies established MTI in the United
States in response to the growing needs among the Japanese
transplants for metric-size tools and "just-in-time"
4
. .
service.
The joint venture successfully wedded Kogu’s
extensive knowledge in "just-in-time" service of precision
tools in Japan with Boeki and Boeki America's comprehensive
network of information about the transplants in the United
States that might require Japanese services and metric-size
tools.
In addition to the "just-in-time" service, MTI strongly
encourages a face-to-face business that includes daily
contacts with customers.

The management repeatedly

emphasizes the quality of service based on the Japanese
method of establishing personal relationships with

^

V")
‘
irn>7
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customers.

MTI sells primarily to Japanese transplants

within 100 miles of the company.

However, MTI is

aggressively developing its customers to the east and south
of the state.

Several important customers are located as

far away as North Carolina.

Due to the continuing

expansion of its business, the company has been successfully
5
producing a profit every year since its establishment.

II.III. The People:

6

Three Japanese men and six local men and women are
currently working at MTI.
the Japanese men.

The management consists of only

Since the president resides in Japan and

only visits the company a few times a year, Takeo "Tom"
Yamano, the Executive Vice President, is largely in charge
of the company.

Now in his early forties and a graduate of

a prestigious private university in Japan, Yamano has been
working for Boeki for almost twenty years.

Because he has

had extensive overseas business experience not only in the
United States but also in Europe, the Middle East, and
Northern Africa, he speaks English comfortably.

However,

the assignment in the United States is his first long-term
international mission.

He has been in the United States for

five years, including three years at MTI.
and energetic in his private life.
cautious and aggressive in business.

Yamano is affable

He is simultaneously
At MTI, the American

10

staff members favor him for his friendliness: they call him
"Tom," and under his influence, the Americans refer to all
the Japanese by their English names.
The two other Japanese are Vice President (and also the
Sales Manager), Yoshihiro "Josh” Takenaka, and supervisor in
sales, Joji "George" Sonoda.

Takenaka and Sonoda, both in

their early thirties, graduated from regional colleges in
western Japan and have been working for Kogu since their
graduation. In Japan, Takenaka has been on the fastest
promotion track to become a branch manager at the age of
thirty-two.

He is aggressive and at times emotional.

He

also takes good care of his Japanese subordinates by
inviting them to his home when Kogu sends them to MTI.

On

the other hand, Sonoda, originally a salesperson at Kogu, is
more subdued than the other two.

However, he has such

extensive knowledge about tools and machinery that not only
the American staff but also Yamano and Takenaka rely upon
him.

Neither Takenaka nor Sonoda had previous business

experience abroad, nor did they have a sufficient command of
English to conduct business in the United States.

However,

their English has improved considerably in the past three
years— enough to make the American staff insist that "there
is no language problem anymore" at MTI.
The adjustment of Yamano, Takenaka, and Sonoda to the
United States— people and business— will be discussed in

11

detail in later chapters.

It should he noted that their

adjustment to the life outside of business has been
reasonably smooth.

Their children and wives are enjoying

new lives in the foreign land, although with some
difficulties.

After five to seven years at MTI, the parent

companies will recall the Japanese at MTI and replace them
by other Japanese managers.
The local American staff consists of three males and
three females.

Two of the men, Scott Smith and Carl

Fischer, are salespeople, while the other man, Randy Brown,
and three women, Marge Bird, Emily Baker, and Jen Heart, are
engaged in general administrative and secretarial work in
the office.

Scott and Marge, now in their forties, have

widely diverse job experience.

Marge, who has been engaged

in secretarial jobs most of her career, is a meticulous
planner.

Scott, who lived in Japan for two years after

completing an undergraduate degree in business, is the only
person at MTI with previous exposure to Japanese culture and
with the ability to speak Japanese.

Emily, the only

non-native of the state, is in her late twenties.

She quit

college one year short of completing her B .A. degree in
business and was working as a secretary before MTI hired
her.

The other three are in their early twenties.

Jen is

trying to complete her accounting degree at a local
vocational school.

Carl and Randy, both graduates of local

12

high schools, have little or no previous job experience.

In

addition to the nine members mentioned above, at least one
Japanese from one of the parent companies is always helping
to ease the heavy workload at MTI.

Thus, in total, about

ten people work in the office.
At MTI, none of the local staff has been fired.

The

American staff members generally favor the management.

Most

of them have no intention of quitting in the future.
Rather, a few have expressed their wishes to work at MTI
"until retirement."

Consequently, the turn-over has been

low: in the past three years, only one man has quit for a
personal reason.

II.IV.

A Typical Day at MTI:
A typical day begins at nine o'clock at MTI.

Unlike

its parent companies in Japan, no formal ceremony marks th<
beginning of the day.

Rather, a rush of phone calls from

the customers acts as a bell indicating the opening of a new
day.

Once the day begins, people in the office have little

time to relax: they frequently receive phone calls and
visitors and make a number of necessary calls.

About half

of the phone calls are from the Japanese engineers, while
the other half are from American purchase agents and
suppliers.
A day at MTI passes by quickly (despite a one-hour

lunch break); at 5:00 p.m., the Americans leave the office.
Though the Japanese usually do not leave at 5:00 p.m., the
atmosphere of the office becomes far more relaxed after the
Americans leave.

The workload remains heavy, but the

Japanese in the office begin chatting and joking in
Japanese.

They can make all the phone calls in their native

language, now that only the Japanese remain at the customer
plants.

After 6:00 p.m. when the office in Japan begins its

day (8:00 a.m. Japan time), the Japanese are usually busy
again obtaining information from Japan about necessary
products.

At the same time, they engage in personal

conversation with their friends at parent companies, topics
of which range from complaints about American staff to
personal gossip to the results of professional baseball
games in Japan.

Not until after 8:00 p.m. do the Japanese

start going home.

It is not at all unusual to see them

working until midnight.

II.V. Methodology:
For one year, I worked with the Japanese and American
people at MTI.

My encounter with MTI came about more by

chance than by a deliberate choice.

I was hired in April

1989, through a connection with Yamano, whom I knew from my
college years.

He needed someone who knew both English and

Japanese to work for a tool distributor that was just being

14

established; he was going to assume the position of
Executive Vice President of the new company.

I accepted his

offer and agreed to work for one year.
My access to a number of important documents that I
translated into Japanese or English enabled me to learn
quickly about the business as well as the history of MTI.
Moreover, not only did I engage in
interpretation/translation, but also I was involved in
sales, import and export, and accounting.

^

This variety of

tasks allowed me to develop an in depth understanding of the
comprehensive business operation at MTI.

The small size of

the company allowed me to have a wide range of
responsibilities.

Moreover, the size of the company was

instrumental in my nurturing a close relationship with
Americans and, especially, with the other Japanese in the
office.

I worked hard; rarely, if ever, did I leave the

office at five o'clock.
me as an "insider."
superiors.

I went on business trips with my

They entrusted me with some important telephone

calls to represent MTI.
namecard.

As a result, people at MTI accepted

I had my company jacket, cap, and

Occasionally, the Japanese even asked my

opinions, as a member of MTI, to make decisions.

And after

a long day of work, my Japanese superiors often invited me
for dinner at their homes, and we talked until late into the
night over drinks.

15

At the same time, however, a realization that my
contract lasted for only a year limited my empathy with the

y

company; I was not a permanent insider at MTI.

y

I belong to any of the parent companies.

Neither did

Naturally, I could \Vrv~'w ^-<

not share the corporate alliances the other Japanese in the /
office had.

This realization enabled me to step back and

view the company from a more detached, outsider*s
perspective.

In this way, my position allowed me to view

the company from inside with an outsider's
perspective— being an "observant-participator."

5

This "observant-participator" status lasted from April
1989 until April 1990 (from the middle of phase one through
two).

I collected the information about MTI prior to my

arrival through interviews, brochures, and documents
available at the office.

As for the period after my

departure, I returned to MTI three times for a total of 12
days.

During those times, I again sat in the office to

observe the differences from and similarities to the time__I
worked at MTI.

I also conducted a series of interviews with

all the personnel.

I had interviews with the American staff

members during office hours in a conference room.

Thanks to

Yamano, who encouraged the Americans to express their candid
opinions to me by assuring the confidentiality of their
responses, I believe I could obtain reasonably honest
viewpoints.

Each interview lasted for forty-five minutes to

16

one hour.
times.

I interviewed some employees as many as three

The Japanese were willing J:jo_be^i.njter-vi-ewed— both. in

the, office during the weekdays and at their homes during the
weekends.
two hours.

Each interview lasted more than one arid a half to
I interviewed all three Japanese, Yamano,

Takenaka and Sonoda, three times.

In addition, in order to

have some reference points, I interviewed several other
people outside of MTI, such as a director at the local
Chamber of Commerce, a Japanese executive of another local
Japanese manufacturing company, and the wives of Japanese
businessmen in the city.

Only a few interviews were tape

recorded because I feared the presence of the recorder might
prevent candid answers.

Therefore, although I took

extensive notes to retain as much information as possible,
the words transcribed in this paper were not recorded
verbatim.

In addition, since all the interviews with the

Japanese were conducted in Japanese, they have been
translated into English.

Chapter III
Phase One

The 500-square-foot temporary MTI office was crowded
with four Japanese and two Americans, piles of tool

1
\ 'X—“vCV
\

catalogs, fax and telex machines, a copier, and six desks
upon which the people stacked purchase orders, invoices,
quotations, and telephone memos.

All but two desks faced

the same direction towards a large window at the front.
Yamano, E.V.P., sat at the corner of the office facing the
back of Takenaka, V.P., who faced the back of Scott, a
salesperson.
window.

Marge sat across from Scott, also facing the

The two Japanese, Sonoda and I, however, sat at the

back of the office facing each other (Figure 1).
MTI's office style was unusual because it fit neither H
of the characteristic American or Japanese styles.

It

differed from the usual American layout where managers often
enjoyed the privilege of retreating to their own offices
while the staff members enjoyed privacy by having partitions
surrounding their desks.

It also differed from the usual

open office style of Japanese companies, where people faced
each other, and the manager sat at the top end of the line

17
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Window

Entrance

Scott

Marge

Conference
Room
Type

Takenaka

Copy
Yamano
Fax
Telex
Author

Sonoda

Warehouse

I

Figure 1: Temporary Office
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of desks (Yoshino 1986: 176, Nevins 1988: 128).

The

Japanese at MTI had come from an environment in which they
faced their colleagues across their desks while they could
bump those sitting next to them with their elbows.
At MTI, the four people looking towards the window had
no one facing or sitting beside them.

Unless they attempted

to peer at others' desks, they could not tell what their
colleagues were doing.

No partitions existed, but the order

of the desks created an invisible partition that provided
people with privacy.

At the same time, however, absence of

partitions allowed people to easily see and hear even the
small incidents that took place in the office.

Not only was

this lack of visible boundaries important for the Japanese
managers to supervise the American staff, but it was also
necessary to enhance a sense of camaraderie between the two
groups by facilitating better communication: one only needed
to turn around to get some assistance or share information.
Meanwhile, Sonoda and I sat in the back facing each other,
in a purely Japanese style.

Neither of us disliked this

arrangement, nor regarded it as strange, although Marge once
commented she would not like her desk facing someone else's.
The office layout at MTI presented a hybrid of commonly
observed Japanese and American systems with an emphasis on
the Japanese style: it retained the open office style
without partitions as well as some desks facing each other,

20

thus suggesting the influence of the all-Japanese
management.

Significantly, even from the beginning, the

Japanese management had altered the basic physical structure
of the Japanese open office style to allow for a wider
physical distance between the individuals in the office.
However, this initial alteration of the typical
Japanese style appeared not so much as a result of the
management's conscious effort to distance itself from the
American employees as a simple copy of the style practiced
at the headquarters of Boeki America.

Far from creating an

emotional and social gap between the Japanese and Americans,
the management at MTI took the utmost care to create a
harmonious relationship by establishing a sense of community
or "family," as the management and staff called it, within
the office.

The Japanese firmly believed that MTI could not

succeed without cooperation.

Yamano, who used to be

involved in plant exports, said from his personal
experience,

"No one person could win a contract for building

a $100 million factory.
effort."

We [at Boeki] needed a collective

For him, the tool and machinery business did not

differ in that sense.

Takenaka, originally a salesman at

Kogu, convinced Scott of the impracticality of commission as
a part of the wage system by showing how many people took
part in one sale at MTI: Scott sold, Sonoda provided him
with supplier information, and I issued an invoice to

21

collect the money.

in short, the management emphasized and

valued collaboration, rather than competition.
Encouraged by this kind of atmosphere, Marge
occasionally bought doughnuts at the company*s expense which
all the members enjoyed with free drinks.

The Japanese and

Americans jocundly teased each other about "getting fat"
from eating the sweets.

Sonoda and Scott made road trips

for sales calls, and Scott, a native of the state, often
took Sonoda through the back roads to show him the rural
country scenes of the American midwest.

Moreover, the

management attentively listened to the opinions of the
American staff members.

Many times they praised the

management for its "accessibility" and "not yelling" even
when the staff made mistakes.

The Japanese suppressed their

occasional resentments when the Americans did not match
their expectations in order to nurture a close "family"
relationship in the office.
The Japanese at MTI kept the tie among themselves even
stronger than their tie with the Americans.

Takenaka and I

often played catch behind the office building.

Several

times, the Japanese left the office at five o*clock to play
a half round of golf together (though they usually returned
to work after sunset).

After a long day of work, just like

they used to do in Japan, the Japanese at MTI often ate and
drank together to relieve the stress from the work and
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engage in a relaxed conversation at one of the managers'
homes.
The decision-making process of the Japanese revealed
the harmony even more strikingly.

Although the Japanese

managers heeded and incorporated the American staff members'
opinions, the management held the occasional managerial
meetings after the staff left at 5:00 p.m.

The Japanese at

MTI reached decisions consensually and cooperatively with a
strong team spirit.

They had active discussions, but they

rarely, if ever, disagreed with each other strongly.

Not

only did the Japanese seek consensus among themselves, but
also they considered a consensus with the parent companies
crucial.

The parent companies cast a strong influence upon

MTI; never a weekday passed without the Japanese at MTI
calling or faxing to Kogu or Boeki in order to exchange
information with their colleagues and superiors.
This emphasis on "family" was a straightforward
importation of a Japanese cultural assumption to the United
States.

Research supports that the Japanese companies

prefer cooperation to competition within the company
(Pascale & Athos 1981: 119).

Typically, management regards

the corporate organization and its employees as a community
or a family in which people share common organizational
goals and cultural values (Morita 1986: 130).

Therefore,

the management's main concern is to maintain the group's

23

harmony (Pascal & Athos 1981: 126).

Thus the management

gives meticulous attention to individuals to ensure their
well-being; each individual is the basis of the company as a
community model.

The creation of the "family" atmosphere at

MTI was a case in which the Japanese consciously attempted
to implant their cultural assumption in American soil.
While the transplantation of the Japanese assumption
about valuing "family" was quite successful at MTI, another
assumption the management attempted to apply was less so.
In Japan, the relationship between the customer and supplier
is closely intertwined in such a way that makes them
dependent upon each other.

It creates a solid production

chain in which a customer and supplier both work closely on
various issues such as the quick and efficient delivery
system of Just-In-Time.

Through close and long

relationships that often include the holding of one
another’s stock, companies "develop a sense of shared
destiny" (Dertouzos 1989: 181).
MTI completely failed to develop a sense of "shared
destiny" with its American suppliers, despite its attempt to
establish relationships with them.

The contacts with

American suppliers to request quotations turned out to be
difficult, not so much because of the language problem
(Scott called often), but because of the prevalence of what
the Japanese called "double-tongued" suppliers.

Often the

24

Japanese managers found a discrepancy between the actual
price and the quoted price.

Worse, the routine discrepancy

between the actual delivery date and quoted date turned out
to be disastrous and embarrassing for MTI, as the gap in
turn delayed the company's delivery to customers and
betrayed the "just-in-time" motto.

Long delivery time often

unexpectedly forced MTI to resort to an expensive way of
importing goods from its parent company in Japan.
This lesson resulted in a feeling among the Japanese
to "Never trust American suppliers."

Scott shared this

feeling because he made a number of contacts on behalf of
the Japanese for quotations or order status.

A phrase,

"because they are Americans [they lie]," became common in
the office to describe the failures of American suppliers.
The Japanese pointed out every mistake among themselves in
the office with the remark,
an insult for them.

"Are you an American?" which was

When the American suppliers did perform

well, they shared surprised feelings such as, "They do well
for Americans!"

The failure of American suppliers to

satisfy the Japanese contributed to the formation of a sense
of superiority to American business, a sense they had only
1
heard and read about while they lived in Japan.
While the Japanese scoffed at American suppliers for
their inefficiency, they prided themselves in sharing a
sense of "destiny" with their customers that enabled them to
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provide the best services.

Such services included quick

delivery— a delivery even before the issuance of a formal
purchase order.

Requests for tools and machinery at

customer plants were usually given to MTI salespeople by the
Japanese supervising engineers who would then turn in their
acquisition requests to the purchasing department.

However,

because of the extensive time required to process paperwork,
the customers provided MTI with a written purchase order and
its number only after a considerable lapse of time.

Since

the Japanese engineers wanted the goods as soon as possible,
the Japanese at MTI opted to supply the requested goods,
even without a purchase order number, to abide by their
motto,

"just-in-time," and to satisfy their Japanese

customers.

After all, Kogu's customers accepted such a

practice in Japan.
However, this service boasted by the Japanese triggered
a major controversy that ultimately forced them to drop
their "flexibility."

The purchasing and receiving

departments, which consisted of American managers and staff,
would not accept any goods without a purchase order number.
MTI's ignoring of their policy created such considerable
confusion among the American-managed accounts payable office
at the customer plants that they threatened to refuse all
payments and to sever their relationship with MTI.
At this moment, MTI could do nothing but to observe the
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instructions given by the Americans.

No matter how

customer-oriented MTI might have been, no money meant no
business.

Its policy not to deliver without a proper

purchase order number outraged the Japanese engineers (who
had nothing to do with the American-managed accounting
office) at the transplants.

M T I *s Japanese managers and the

engineers held a number of meetings in which the latter
accused the former of "Americanizing," just like the
Japanese management at MTI accused its American suppliers'
lack of service spirit.

Even though the "American" way

could mean a delay in the delivery, the very betrayal of
their proud motto of "just-in-time," MTI had to stand firm
on adhering to the "American" way because its implementation
could affect the survival of the company.
Thus, in the first year of its operation the Japanese
management at MTI adhered to cultural assumptions they had
brought from Japan.

Some assumptions seemed to apply

equally well in the United States as they did in Japan.

The

most notable was the value of "family" atmosphere that made,
as Yamano said, "people want to come to the office every
morning."

Even though the management arranged a wider

physical distance than its Japanese counterparts, emotional
and social distance among not only the Japanese but also the
American staff remained close.

On the other hand, the

Japanese found out that not all Japanese assumptions fit
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well in the United States.
tight-knit,

Business based on the

"destiny sharing" production chain was

impossible in the United States because the suppliers could
not cooperate with the concept of "just-in-time" service and
customers required an indication of contractual agreement
for every business transaction.

The Japanese management

felt frustrated with the difference.

The Japanese managers

depressurized their frustration with suppliers by routinely
degrading them verbally in their conversation and confirming
their own superiority.

However, the problem with the

customers provided them with no option but to adapt to the
system in the United States in order for their business to
survive.

Chapter IV
Phase Two

On a freezing day in December of 1989,

while the

American staff members were enjoying their holiday break,
eight Japanese men sent by Kogu transferred everything from
the crowded temporary office to a brand new
14,OOO-square-foot building that was just completed in an
industrial park, about six miles away.

The new building had

an office space of 4,OOO-square-feet with the remainder of
the space serving as a warehouse.

In anticipation of a

future increase in personnel, the management at MTI decided
to purchase six additional desks to bring the total number
of desks in the new office to twelve.
The Japanese at MTI laid out the office arrangement in
advance using a cardboard model.

They decided that the

open-style office would be continued; only the president's
office was kept separate.

The president's room was a

luxurious space with a plush carpet, a $1,600 oak desk, a
fancy clock, and two large windows, but it remained
unoccupied.

This room stood as a constant reminder that the

president of MTI lived in Japan: he was, first, the
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president of Kogu, then he was the president of MTI.
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preferred to have a relationship that was not "'dry', cool,
and calculated, but 'wet' with human emotion" (Vogel 1979:
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Second, additional file cabinets would be given to everyone,
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vertical attachment, a desk, an aisle, and a desk behind.
Carefully, I created an office plan (Figure 2).
The arrangement of the non-facing desk order was a
continuation of the previous office style.

This time,

however, the style became consistent: no one faced each
other at all.

The Japanese management completed the

revision of its assumption on the physical structure of the
office by providing a small alcove that gave everyone a
greater space to work.

Unlike the Japanese style, in which

the managers have bigger desks, the area at MTI was large
enough to allow the same amount of space for everyone.
Consequently, the Japanese and Americans had more privacy
than in a typical office style in which people could catch a
glimpse of what others had in their drawers.
At the same time, however, a strong Japanese influence
prevailed.

The supervision remained strong.

Since Yamano

wanted to sit at a desk from which he could oversee the
entire operation, he sat at the lower-left hand corner.
Takenaka wanted to sandwich Scott in between himself and
Sonoda in order to "watch" what Scott did in sales.

In

addition, Takenaka implemented a policy practiced in the
parent company which required people to clean off their
desks completely everyday before they left? they had to go
through everything on their desks in order to remind
themselves how much work remained.

Above all, management at

Entrance

Jen

Shelves and Cabinets -!

Unoccupied

Carl

Unoccupied

Yamano

Emily

Randy

Hayashi

Sonoda

Marge

Scott

Computer
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Warehouse
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Copy
President’s Room

Conference Room

Fax Telex
Computer
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Figure 2: New Office (Arrangement as of April, 1991)
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MTI not only refused personal office space but also
partitions.

The absence of partitions continued to

facilitate occasional casual conversations and jokes which
brought laughter and, importantly, a sense of friendship, or
"family," in a tangible way.
Even with greater physical distance among employees,
the sense of family remained strong, thanks to the conscious
efforts not only by the Japanese but also by the American
staff.

By helping the Japanese managers in a strange land,

Marge and Scott developed a feeling that they "helped to set
up MTI."

"MTI is part of me," said Marge.

Curiously, M T I *s new location in an industrial park
helped nurture a further sense of a cozy "family"
atmosphere.

After the move, the Japanese did not have

enough time to drive into town to have lunch like they often
did in the temporary office.

Consequently, people at MTI

started eating together in the kitchen.

One person, either

a young Japanese helper from Kogu or I, would take an order
and go purchase lunch for everyone.

Then people sat around

a small dining table and had Wendy's hamburgers, chili, and
fries.

On other occasions, the Japanese brought in and

cooked rice and noodles ("udon") in the kitchen.

When

Japanese noodles were made, Marge and Scott willingly tried
them, much to the amazement and excitement of the Japanese.
Eating is a curious habit; it binds people.

In Japan,
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the Japanese go out to eat and drink together after work to
share their feelings, opinions, and reinforce their ties as
members of the same corporate organization as well as to
heal the "on-the-job psychic injuries" (Pascal & Athos 1981:
127).

This relaxed socialization functions as a

"safety-valve in the Japanese management" to depressurize
the need for competition and individualism (Chang 1982: 87).
True, lunch at MTI differed from after-work eating and
drinking; no one drank alcohol, and language always caused a
problem when it came to topics unrelated to tools and
machinery.

Nevertheless, the simple act of eating lunch

together enhanced the sense of MTI as one "family" entity
where "everyone liked each other."
Between the kitchen and office at MTI, there was a
space called "computer corner."

The move to the new office

initiated the full implementation of a computer system at
MTI.

The introduction of a computer system resulted from a

careful decision by the management, despite an unusual
opposition expressed by some members of Boeki in Japan.
Those who expressed strong hesitation to computerization
reasoned that the time was "premature" to make such a major
investment.

However, the management at MTI finally

convinced them by indicating that "the majority of
respectable companies in America" were computerized.

As a

result, MTI purchased a networked computer system with three
stations.
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Unexpectedly for the management, this introduction of
new technology posed a challenging operational problem to
the Japanese.

For the first time it became necessary to

make clear distinctions between individual job
responsibilities in order to assure the input of accurate
information to the computer.

Information had to be keyed in

collectively and systematically in order to avoid duplicate
or loss of information.

For example, someone had to become

exclusively responsible for keying in information about the
receipts of goods while another had to be responsible for
the receipts of invoices.

In addition, it was necessary to

have someone oversee the entire operation to ensure the
accuracy of information before it was posted everyday.
At this moment, MTI had only seven people; it was
impossible to have a purchasing department, a receiving
department, an accounting department, etc.

Yamano had

stressed that in a small operation like MTI, "things had to
be worked at collectively and responsibly."
been some distinct divisions of labor.

True, there had

For example, Marge

oversaw expenses, and I took care of all the translation and
interpretation jobs.

Overall, the distinctions among the

individuals' jobs had been blurred.

With the beginning of

full operation of the computer system, however, the Japanese
mangers made the distinctions, for the first time, that I
would be in charge of the receiving, Marge would issue the

35

checks, and the helper from Japan, Matsuda, would take care
of purchase orders.
The emergence of these distinctions in jobs challenged
cultural assumptions held by the Japanese at MTI.
"job description" does not exist in Japan.

Clear

Although

companies in Japan have a formal structure based on the
specialty of each section (in the case of Boeki, based on
the geography and products), each individuals job under the
section chief is hardly defined (Yoshino 1986: 106).

If

Japanese companies provide written job descriptions at all,
they give them to the section, and only in an extremely
broad way (Yoshino 1986: 113).

Within the section,

therefore, people are generalists who are capable of
managing a variety of tasks.

The Japanese companies prefer

such generalists to specialists (Morita 1986: 184).
Naturally, as seen in phase one, the Japanese at MTI had
long resisted the idea of job descriptions by pointing out
that no one job could be completed by one specialist; hence,
a clear-cut job definition was not feasible and was
unnecessary.
Nevertheless, in response to the introduction of a
computer system, the task of creating job descriptions
appeared unavoidable.

Although at this stage the Japanese

managers at MTI made informal, verbal distinctions ("Can you
do this?";

"I think so."), they felt that more comprehensive
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job descriptions might be necessary in the future as the
volume in business expanded.
During the second year, the effort by the Japanese at
MTI to retain their cultural value of "family" continued.
As a result, they maintained a close social and emotional
relationship with each other.

However, the introduction of

a computer system and the subsequent emergence of job
descriptions portended the widening of such distances by the
creation of boundaries of responsibility around each
individual.

Despite a strong faith in the maintenance of a

"family" atmosphere, the proximity of emotional and social
distance would soon start coming apart in proportion to the
wider physical distance of the new office.

At that time,

the Japanese at MTI were left with a deep sense of
frustration because they were at a loss how to efficiently
and effectively delegate the responsibilities to the staff.
That is, coming from a culture where "job descriptions" did
not exist, they could not provide proper job descriptions
for their American staff members.
The sense of frustration over the difficulty in
providing job descriptions continued to accumulate until it
brought an outburst of emotion.

The specific incident

signaling the extent of the frustration occurred during the
physical inventory count at the end of the second year, on
December 22, 1990, almost a year after MTI had moved into
the new building.
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On that cold winter day, the lights at MTI were turned
on at 6:45 a.m.

By 7:00 a.m., two hours before regular

office hours, all the Japanese and Americans were present.
Normal operation had been shut down the day before, and the
22nd, the last business day of the year for MTI, was
reserved for the warehouse inventory count.
MTI had an inventory of $800,000 with over 1,000
different items ranging from drill blades to rulers to
industrial brushes.

Despite the early start, the Japanese

managers had predicted that the counting would not be
finished until after sunset.

Yamano and Takenaka "ordered"

the staff to abide by Muto's instructions for that day's
work.

(Muto was a temporary helper from Japan who was about

to return after a three-month mission.)

He assigned

everyone a section to count and the work began in the chilly
warehouse.
Sometime between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m., Marge decided to
go to the kitchen to have a cup of coffee.

Almost at the

same time, Scott left the warehouse to get a can of soda.
Meanwhile, telephones rang frequently in the office with
calls from several Japanese plants that were still in
operation on that day.

Sonoda, Muto, and Yamano left the

warehouse to take the calls.

Since some people had called

for Scott, Emily, who was taking the phone calls that day,

38

left the office to hand him the messages and found both
Marge and him in the kitchen.

They started to chat, just as

they often did on other days.
Jen had just started working for MTI to alleviate the
heavy workload of Marge and Emily.

Not familiar with the

procedure of counting, she asked Takenaka a question.

Not

knowing the others had left the warehouse and wondering why
she came all the way to ask him a question, Takenaka asked,
"Why don't you ask your partner [Marge]?"
innocently,

Jen replied,

"Oh, I think she's taking a break."

Takenaka looked around him, only to realize that he and
Jen were the only people in the chilly warehouse struggling
with counting the tools.

He immediately went to the main

building where he spotted the three American staff members
in the kitchen.

But first, he approached Muto, who had just

been on the phone, and asked, "Did you tell them to take a
break?"

"No," said Muto.

strode into the kitchen.

Then Takenaka turned around and
He was infuriated.

For the first

time in the two years since he had come to MTI, he yelled:
"WHO SAID YOU CAN TAKE BREAK!

GO BACK TO WAREHOUSE!"

A moment of silence prevailed.
stood stunned.

Scott, Marge, and Emily

They had never been yelled at, even when

they had committed disastrous mistakes (such as Scott having
$1,500 in tools stolen from the unlocked delivery vehicle).
Yamano came running from the office to find out what had
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happened.

Finally, Scott mumbled in Japanese, "I’m sorry."

Then he returned to the warehouse.

In his mind, however, he

angrily thought, "He didn't have to yell!

If this is that

important of a job, he should have told us!"
furious.

Although she refrained from talking back, in her

mind she repeated,

"This wasn't really a break!

always come in to the kitchen for coffee?
to yell!"

Don't we

He had no right

She later refused to take a break when Muto

formally declared one.
angry.

Marge felt

Emily was more astonished than

She had thought that Japanese people never yell

since they disliked conflict.

The interesting aspect of this incident is how the
Japanese and Americans perceived the reason for Takenaka's
sudden and uncommon outburst of anger.

The American staff

members seemed oblivious to the instruction given by the
management to follow Muto's orders.

In the later

interviews, they never mentioned about their responsibility
to abide by Muto's orders on that day.

Rather, they

attributed the incident to an aberration, based on a
particular mood of Takenaka on that day.

"He must have

gotten up on the wrong side of the bed," they said.

The

staff members felt the anger was not their fault, and
instead blamed Takenaka's caprice.
On the other hand, in Japan any strong expression of
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one's emotion in an office is a rarity.

Rohlen, in his

study of a Japanese Bank, found that "an outburst of
anger... receives immediate notice and often leads to
interpersonal problems that take a long time to resolve"
(1974: 97).

Such problems are nothing but detrimental for

the Japanese, whose primary interest is to keep a sense of
harmony ("family") within any organization.

Thus,

Takenaka's anger cannot be attributed to a simple mood.
Rather, Takenaka and the other Japanese at MTI justified his
outrage by claiming that the Americans failed to follow the
instruction given by the management to follow Muto's orders
on that day.

Takenaka became infuriated not so much because

the Americans took a respite from work, but because the
Americans neglected the order to follow Muto's instructions.
The anger over the staff members' negligence to perform the
assignment was combined with the pressure to complete the
long and tedious physical inventory count within one day
until the frustration could not have been repressed anymore.
This incident represents a crisis of appropriate
leadership by the Japanese management.

The management

lacked an effective strategy for communicating with the
American staff about even a simple assignment for a day's
activity, let alone any job descriptions that covered the
staff's everyday activity.

Chapter V
Phase Three

The Japanese at MTI never discussed the unpleasant
December incident.

Nevertheless, they sensed the necessity

of "job descriptions."

Since they had no experience in

writing job descriptions, Yamano came up with the novel idea
of asking the staff members to define their own job
descriptions.
The result was a two-page "Position Description
Questionnaire," that Yamano made during the long holiday
vacation after the December incident.

On the first page, he

defined the purpose of this questionnaire as "to assign a
proper [i.e. particular] person to a proper job and
responsibility."
first question,

Then he asked three questions.

In the

"Position Responsibilities Summary," he

asked the staff members to "describe the basic function(s)
or purpose" of their positions.

Next he requested them to

describe their "Principal Duties" in the order of
importance.

The last question asked them to "identify"

their "knowledge and skills" that may be useful for their
jobs at MTI.
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The questionnaire was a strange, if not bizarre,
approach to provide the staff with clear job descriptions:
Why should the management ask the staff to define their
responsibilities?, Why should the management, after hiring
the staff, feel the need to assign them to "proper" jobs?
This approach taken by Yamano inverted the normal hiring
procedure in the United States in which the employers hire
people to fill in the open "slots."

It reflected a

confusion of the Japanese management in their attempt to
create job descriptions, something "American" they had never
seen or made, which had not been given to the staff members
upon their employment.
The Japanese assumption that ambiguous job descriptions
for each individual would maintain a generalist attitude was
deeply ingrained in the managers' minds.

Therefore, they

failed to provide any concrete job descriptions by utilizing
the questionnaire, much to the disappointment of the
American staff members who responded to the questionnaire
hoping to have their jobs defined clearly.

"I don't know

what happened, but it must have drifted away," shrugged
Emily, while Yamano quietly confessed, "It is so difficult
to accommodate what they want to do."
Soon after giving out the questionnaire, the Japanese
decided to hire two more men, Randy and Carl.

Because the

Japanese and Scott sold aggressively, this addition came
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concomitant with a continued increase in MTI's business
volume.

The management hired Randy and Carl because they

were both young and inexperienced.

Like its parent

companies in Japan, MTI preferred someone whom it could mold
over someone who had had considerable experience in other
American companies.

In the same month, Kogu sent another

Japanese man, Hayashi, to replace Muto.

Unlike Muto,

Hayshi's mission was potentially long-term because he was to
become a manager of sales administration (if he could obtain
a working visa).

The work volume of sales administration

had been increasing dramatically at MTI without direction
from any experienced Japanese manager.
Ironically, the increase in the number of personnel did
not lighten the burden of others.

Rather, their presence

created further confusion among the American staff members
because of the lack of individual job description and
training.

The management "experimentally" assigned Carl to

sales and Randy to sales administrative work, after hiring
them without "job descriptions."

However, their assignments

did not go beyond these generic categories.

Consequently,

to the eyes of the other Americans, Randy and Carl "were
thrown in without explanation or overseeing" of their jobs.
The older staff members believed that because of Randy and
Carl's age and lack of experience, the management should
give the two more detailed instructions about their jobs.
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Scott, who had lived in Japan long enough to familiarize
himself with the Japanese culture and custom, was for a long
time carefree about the necessity for specific job
descriptions and was a believer in on-the-job-training
(OJT).

However, he came to feel the necessity of more

specific assignments and training because the new employees
were "not aggressive enough to look for their own jobs" like
the more experienced staff had been left to do.

Unlike the

Japanese, the older staff members considered Randy and
Carl's lack of experience a disadvantage that created the
absolute necessity of providing them with concrete
assignments and training.
The arrival of Hayashi brought further chaos to the
understanding of job descriptions.

His future title, the

manager of sales administration, demanded that he learn
every job performed by the sales administrative staff.

For

a long time, however, the management did not make it clear
that Hayashi would become the "boss" of the sales
administrative staff in the future.

Consequently, the staff

members were perplexed with this man "who tried to do
everything."

Marge, who had worked the longest at MTI among

the administrative staff, felt "a power problem" when
Hayashi, a temporary helper in her mind, gave her an order
to report all the problems to him, rather than to Yamano.
(Yamano, who wished to keep his accessibility, later

45

overruled Hayashi's order.)

Rather than considering Hayashi

as a future "boss," all the American staff regarded him as
an accountant from the accounting department of Kogu.

In

actuality, however, he had never belonged to the accounting
department at Kogu.

Rather, he "disliked" accounting and

wanted to "stay away from it as much as possible."

His

responsibility, according to Takenaka, covered overseeing
the entire sales administrative work and "accounting was
[only] a part of it."

Once again, this misunderstanding

over the role of Hayashi was a case of ineffective
communication regarding the responsibility of each
individual.
The management sensed the confusion in the lowered
morale of the staff.

On behalf of other staff members,

Marge talked with Yamano to express her concern over the
problems: the management was not giving Randy and Carl
proper assignments and training and Hayashi was acting like
a boss.

Marge thought Yamano had to be informed because he

had "no idea how disastrous" the situation was.

The crisis

of leadership, the management's inability to communicate the
basic messages that once manifested in Takenaka's yelling
incident, had not improved.
deteriorate.

The situation continued to

As a result, in the face of this chaos, the

Japanese began expressing a need for a comprehensive
"manual" that would not only include clear job descriptions
but also how the jobs should be performed.
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This need for the creation of a "manual" was the first
open acknowledgement by the Japanese of the need to
streamline the structure of MTI and to create formal job
definitions and methods of training.

They felt it necessary

to start carefully supervising and controlling the
activities of the Americans by defining their positions
clearly and assigning them to particular slots.

However,

like "job description," "manual" remained a foreign concept
to the Japanese.

They continued to use the English term

"manual" (pronounced ma-nu-a-ru) in their conversation; they
had no equivalent word in Japanese.

Through OJT, rotation

of jobs, and a strong commitment to the company (rather than
to one's own work), the Japanese had been working without
any "manual."

Sonoda, who holds an undergraduate degree in

Law, remembered how he was "thrown into" sales calls without
much knowledge of tools or "how-to" in sales.

The customers

became frustrated and yelled at him, which in turn forced
him to learn more about tools.

Through trial-and-error on

the job, he had gained a comprehensive knowledge of tools
and machinery including the ability to discern the needs of
the customers from rough sketches completed by the
engineers.

Likewise, Yamano, who represents Boeki— one of

the largest companies in the world, had never worked with a
"manual." Yamano, who majored in Spanish, had been involved
in plant exports to various countries.

He learned the
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extensive knowledge of "how-to" in plant export, an
incredibly complex job differing from country to country and
from one kind of plant to another, through on-the-job
experience and training.

Considering these experiences of

the Japanese, it may be said that a practical reason
prevented the Japanese from making a "manual": they did not
know how to make it because they did not have a concrete
understanding of what a "manual" really was.

In other

words, they did not have a manual for making a "manual."
Another reason seems to have prevented the management
from making a "manual."

Inherent in the minds of the

Japanese at MTI was a scepticism that if they delineated
each staff member*s realm of responsibility, she or he would
not go beyond that prescription.

Coming from a culture that

valued generalists, the Japanese managers could not satisfy
themselves with specialists.

They were already seeing the

disturbing result of specialization of work among the
suppliers.

Aside from the fact that the suppliers were not

trustworthy (one of the first things the Japanese learned
early in their first year of business), the Japanese always
felt frustrated because the suppliers usually assigned only
one sales representative to MTI and no one else could
follow-up the person*s job.

"*I don't know' is a typical

American stuff," griped Sonoda, "In Japan,
not acceptable.

'I don't know' is

If you belong to the same company, you

should be able to take care of others' jobs."
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Although the Japanese regarded the staff at MTI as
"better than normal Americans," they feared that a "manual"
could cause the same phenomenon among the staff: they would
cease to work when they had fulfilled their stated job.
This was far from acceptable for the management.

Moreover,

if the management described every aspect of the job, the
staff would not be able to cope with exceptions, which the
Japanese considered a "specialty" at MTI.

As indicated in

phase one (chapter III), a close cooperation ("destiny
sharing") between the Japanese supplier and customer is
considered a unique strength that brings success to Japanese
companies.

Not surprisingly, at MTI, the Japanese

emphasized such an unusual cooperation, even though the
requirement by the customers to follow formal paperwork
often trapped the Japanese.

They took pride in their

"flexibility" which was synonymous with satisfying
exceptional requests by the customers.

When Sonoda received

phone calls at home on Saturday or Sunday from a customer
asking for tools, he would try to deliver them.

The

Japanese wondered whether, after making a "manual," the
American staff would become less flexible and more
specialized, an idea that disturbed them, to say the least.
In this way, while feeling the need to create a
"manual" in the face of confusion among the American staff,
the Japanese remained helplessly frustrated in their
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inability and hesitation to create a "manual.”

Grudgingly,

the Japanese who felt triumphant over American business
admitted that they were "way behind" in their "technology of
making a manual."
create a "manual."

They resented the fact that they had to
After all, it was something

"unnecessary" by Japanese standards.

And if anything of the

sort was made in Japan at all, the managers would only have
needed to affix their seals as an affirmation, after the
diligent and capable subordinates created everything (Nakane
1970: 69).

On the contrary, the Japanese at MTI had to try

to create a "manual" for their subordinate American staff
members.

In a sense, then, by Japanese standards, the

management at MTI did not have "subordinates."
The Japanese frustration that triggered an outburst of
anger began to reveal itself, once again, but this time
gradually in the management's loss of enthusiasm to retain
the "family" atmosphere.

The Japanese who had carefully and

consciously created the "family" at MTI began to doubt its
value and meaning.

The management attributed its inability

to communicate with and control the staff effectively to the
freedom the staff was enjoying.

The Japanese began

suspecting they had been too tolerant. They feared that they
had "indulged" the Americans so much that the staff members
regarded the management as "soft." "We must tighten up the
control where it's necessary," said Yamano.
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Disintegration of the faith in "family” began to show
itself in the kitchen.

The place of conversation/ laughter/

and friendship at the lunch table started to change.
Takenaka suggested that everyone take lunch at his or her
own discretion, not altogether.

This was overruled by

Yamano, who was most responsible for creating the sense of
"family."

However, Yamano himself began going home at lunch

hour, Sonoda was often out on business calls, and Takenaka
often brought his own lunch.
joviality.

People ate quietly and returned quickly to their

desks— to their alcoves.
anymore.

The kitchen lost its

No one cooked in the kitchen

There were no more doughnuts.

Drinks, which were

always free, became 25$.
The generally amicable relationship between the
Japanese and Americans remained the same on the surface.
There was occasional laughter and excitement in the office.
Once, Marge brought a cake for Hayashi's birthday.

But the

ambience was quiet and less empathic than Yamano's birthday
party two years before when everyone eagerly joined in
hilarity to celebrate the day with crackers, presents, and a
cake.
A series of crises that challenged the basic cultural
assumptions of the Japanese characterized the third phase of
MTI.

The management came to realize that a "manual," a

comprehensive document encompassing job descriptions and
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training methods, needed to be created.

But this

realization did not make the process of creating a "manual"
a smooth one.

While the Japanese felt the necessity of

controlling the American staff members to avoid confusion by
creating a "manual," which they did not know how to create,
they feared the control would deprive the staff members of
any potential to become generalists.

In other words, while

the Japanese at MTI keenly wished to create a "manual"
because they felt the staff members were left too "free" and
needed to be controlled, the managers possessed strong
qualms about specifying the jobs too much because that might
deprive their subordinates of the freedom to venture into
unspecified job responsibilities.

This vertiginous way of

thinking was never resolved in phase three.

Though the

Japanese had determined to "do something" about the
situation, they had not yet learned what to do.

Chapter VI
Conclusion

In less than three years, the priority of the Japanese
managers at MTI has shifted from establishing a "family"
atmosphere in the office to creating a "manual," although
they are still ambivalent about its value because they
believe in the idea of a company "family" comprised of
generalists.

For the Japanese management, ’’family" and

"manual" are not compatible concepts.

Therefore, the effort

of the Japanese to create a harmonious office under a
people-oriented management has been superseded by an effort
to establish a more mechanical and hierarchical relationship
between the Japanese and Americans by assigning each
individual staff member to a particular slot.
There are three main reasons why a "manual" became
necessary at MTI.

First, the rapid growth of business that

necessitated the introduction of a computer system and
increase in personnel made some distinctions of
responsibilities among the individuals inevitable.
Consequently, the Japanese divided the company into sales
and sales administration divisions.
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Second, despite this general distinction made by the
Japanese management, the Americans at MTI were used to
working with more specific assignments from their previous
jobs, rather than working as generalists within a broader
category.

For example, Marge had been working in an

American company where everyone specialized in a particular
job and did not share their jobs with the others in the
office because "if others could do your job, you could
easily be replaced."

The American staff at MTI was

accustomed to Tayloristic "scientific management" where
employees were classified and tabulated under "rules, laws,
and formula" (Taylor 1911s 36).
Third, the Americans wanted to ascertain their
significance in the office through clear definitions of
their positions as described in a "manual."

The American

staff members felt uncomfortable because the Japanese
management monopolized all the power in the office— a kind
of power in a corporate organization that "allows people to
get things done, to mobilize resources, to get and use
whatever it is that a person needs for the goals he or she
is attempting to make" (Kanter 1977: 166).

Consequently,

the Americans who were "powerless inside an authority
structure" became "rules minded in response to the limited
options for power in their situation" (Kanter 1977: 192).
The staff members needed "rules" that they could refer to in
order to assure their roles in the office.
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The Japanese monopolized the "power" at MTI not only by
assigning every American to the staff level and keeping the
management homogeneous, but also by taking advantage of
their affiliation with the parent companies and their
language skill.

As in most other Japanese multinational

firms, MTI•s tie with its parent companies is crucial
(Yoshino 1976: 169): they assist the company with various
aspects of its operation, such as determining business
strategies, providing information about customers and
products, and arranging financial matters.

Everyday the

Japanese at MTI keep in close contact with their superiors,
subordinates, and friends at Boeki and Kogu by calling,
faxing to and telexing to Japan.

Membership in the parent

companies is essential for the management.

In fact, the

parent companies assure this strong tie by choosing all the
management personnel at MTI.

Sooner or later, Yamano,

Takenaka, and Sonoda will be recalled to Japan and replaced
by other Japanese from Boeki and Kogu.

The American staff

members, on the other hand, do not have any direct
connection with the parent companies.

For example, when the

Americans need to obtain information or goods from Japan,
they must always work through the Japanese, who will in turn
contact Japan on their behalf.
Language difference also enables the Japanese to
monopolize the "power" at MTI because the Americans know
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only English (except for Scott, who has some Japanese verbal
communication skill), whereas the Japanese know both English
and Japanese.

Although by no means are the Japanese fluent

in English, their knowledge of both languages gives them two
advantages over the American staff.

First, the Americans*

lack of knowledge of the Japanese language prevents them
from obtaining readily available information in the office
such as conversation among the Japanese, fax and telex
messages from Japan, brochures and catalogs in Japanese.
The Japanese management can easily monopolize the
information by not translating important messages written in
Japanese and by communicating in Japanese when confidential
discussions are required.

Second, unlike the Japanese, the

Americans cannot monopolize the information in their
language because the Japanese can read letters, catalogs,
quotations, and other essential documents written in
English.

In addition, thanks to the open style office, the

Japanese can closely supervise the intra- and inter-office
conversation of the Americans in English.
Increase in business volume, the prior experiences of
the American staff members, and deprivation of power by the
Japanese through the use of differences in their titles and
knowledge of language brought the issue of "manual" to the
surface at MTI.

To the mind of the Japanese, this "manual"

ran counter to the idea of "family," which is a typical
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characteristic of the Japanese management (Johnson & Ouchi
1974, Clark 1979: 40, Ibe 1980, Itami 1987).
In the Japanese company where relationships among the
members are kept close throughout their lifetime, a "manual"
that clearly defines each individual's job in writing is not
necessary because people are supposed to sense what their
superiors and colleagues expect.

That is, communication

often takes "non verbal forms? one is expected to read the
minds of others without resorting to verbal articulation"
(Yoshino 1976: 167).

Because the Japanese at MTI came from

such an environment, one of their frequent complaints about
their American subordinates was, "Why do we have to tell
them everything they need to do?"

Sonoda said, "In Japan,

you can expect your subordinates to do 100% work with only
50% instruction.

In America, you have to give 100% to

expect 100%!"
Nakane substantiates this value of generalists in the
Japanese company by indicating that in a Japanese
organization, "responsibility is diffused through the group
as a whole" and there is an "absence of clearly
differentiated roles for each" (Nakane 1970: 80, 81).
Therefore,

"there are no clear-cut spheres or divisions of

responsibility between the manager and his subordinates, and
the entire group becomes one functional body in which all
individuals, including the manager, are amalgamated into a

57

single entity" (Nakane 1970: 69).

The establishment of a

"manual" that defines each individuals realm of
responsibility reverses the Japanese assumption of a
group-oriented approach to jobs.

Therefore, for the

Japanese at MTI, the attempt to implement a "manual" came
concomitant with the loss of faith in creating a "family"
that incorporated their American subordinates.
Although the Japanese have not been able to create a
"manual" because of their ambivalence toward and their lack
of knowledge about how to make one, the emphasis on "manual"
and the simultaneous decline in "family" is likely to
intensify at MTI in the future.

A continual expansion of

business will require the company to hire more American
personnel, whereas the number of Japanese will remain the
same because visa acquisition to work at MTI is becoming
increasingly difficult.

The growth in business will also

allow MTI to open a branch office in another state.

In that

case, the Japanese management envisions promoting an
American staff member (most likely Scott) for the first time
to a managerial position as a branch manager.

However, in

order assure a smooth operation of the branch office, the
management considers effective supervision essential.

For

example, Takenaka thinks that in order to effectively
supervise,
office.

every sale must be reported daily to the main

In any case, the supervision and control of
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Americans will be an important concern for the Japanese
management.
Other observers of Japanese companies in the United
States often comment about the duality between the Japanese
and Americans (Kidahashi 1987), which, at MTI, emerged after
the concept of "family" started to break down.

Although

American scholars frequently discuss the value and necessity
of adopting the people-oriented management style of the
Japanese company (Ouchi 1981, Pascal & Athos 1981, Lu 1987),
it seems that the Japanese are not too successful in
importing and adapting their own system to American soil.
The Japanese at MTI certainly tried the Japanese way, but
after a little more than two years, the Japanese way has
become applicable only among the Japanese who themselves
still value harmony and consensus.

In the same way that the

Japanese thought American suppliers and customers were
inefficient and untrustworthy, the Japanese managers at MTI
lost confidence in their American staff.

After all the

effort to create harmony in the office, duality steadily and
powerfully defines the Japanese-American relationships at
MTI.

NOTES

Chapter I
1.

A paper presented by Justin D. Niehoff at the Annual

Meeting of the American Anthropological Association on
November 30, 1990, explains the lack of unified
organizational culture in a U.S.-based Japanese bank because
of cultural clashes.

Due to the bank's policy, Niehoff's

paper is not available for quotation.

In another

unpublished paper, Jill Kleinberg supports cultural clashes
within a Japanese computer firm in California.
2.

See for example, a series of articles in The Los

Angeles Times from July 11 to July 13, 1988, and an article,
"Do it my way," in The Economist, 24-30 November 1990: 74+
3.

I have created the pseudonym, Metric Tools

International, Inc., in order to protect the identity of the
company.

Chapter II
1.

Figures are taken from a community audit published in

1991 by the city's economic development board.
2.

1989 figure.

3.

1990 figures (Boeki and Boeki America).
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[Notes to pages 6 - 16]

4.

First innovated by Toyota Motor Company and implemented

in the 1960s, "Just-In-Time" service is a system in which
parts are produced and delivered just before they are needed
at the factory lines in order to keep the inventory cost as
low as possible.

"Just-In-Time" has become a prevalent

production system in Japan and is now being used in the
United States by companies such as General Motors.
5.

The total sales figures of the company has fluctuated

from $4 million in the first year to $6.2 million in the
second year to $4.5 million in the third year.

However,

many of the sales in the first two years consisted of large
and expensive (up to $2.5 million) machines imported from
Japan that were needed before beginning the operation of
customer transplants.

Sales of tools, a major growth

indicator for MTI, has continued to increase all three
years.

In the third year, MTI sold $2.5 million worth of

tools in contrast with $1.9 million the year before.
6.

In order to protect the identity of the individuals,

names used in this paper are pseudonyms.

I refer to the

Japanese by their last names and Americans by their first
names because Americans in the office are always called by
their first names, whereas the Japanese tend to use last
names in the conversations among themselves (in my case,
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[Notes to pages 17 - 27]

being the youngest in the office I always attached an
honorific ending "san," which is omitted in this paper).
The Americans, on the other hand, call the Japanese by their
first names.

Chapter III
1.

Many articles and books published in Japan discuss the

decline of American business.

For example, the translation

of Made In America (by Michael Dourtouzos e t . al.), which
explores the cause of decline in international
competitiveness of various American industries, has been
well received in Japan.

Noboru Makino, one of Japan's

well-known business critics, writes that America has become
Japan's "Manchuria" because its major exports to Japan haven
been reduced to products such as lumber, coal, wheat and
corn (1981: 50).
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